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theory-theory, simulation, and modularity accounts. They neglect,
however, to address how a constructivist account might be related
to a newer, rapidly maturing, alternative theoretical perspective –
the executive function account.
The term “executive function” broadly refers to those cognitive
functions that underlie goal-directed behavior and that are
thought to be mediated by the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Welsh et al.
1991). A growing number of researchers maintain that gains made
in executive function abilities in the preschool years contribute
significantly to theory-of-mind performance (e.g., Carlson &
Moses 2001; Carlson et al. 1998; 2002; Frye et al. 1995b; Hala &
Russell 2001; Hala et al. 2003; Hughes 1998; Russell 1996; Zelazo
et al. 1997). As children increase their capacity to control and di-
rect their own actions, they become able to view alternative
courses of action – including actions based on beliefs (Russell
1996).
In contrast to the theories criticized by C&L, an executive ac-
count can readily incorporate the notion of a more gradual onset
of social understanding. Development of both executive control
and social understanding begin early and emerge over an ex-
tended period of time. Indeed, the precocious performance found
in many “modified” false belief and deception tasks (which the au-
thors highlight as increasing personal or social activity) may be ex-
plained in terms of reductions in the executive demands of the
tasks.
To illustrate: typical false belief tasks draw on at least two exec-
utive demands: (1) working memory (of where the object was in
the beginning or what the child thought was in a box) combined
with (2) inhibitory control (inhibit pointing to the spot where the
object is now known to be or reporting what one now knows is re-
ally in the box). Recent research has confirmed that those execu-
tive tasks that combine both working memory and inhibitory con-
trol are most strongly related to theory-of-mind performance
(Carlson et al. 2002; Hala et al. 2003). Reducing one or both of
these executive demands may result in improved performance.
For example, Freeman and Lacohée (1995) found that having
children “post” a picture of what they thought was in a box helped
them later to recall their own false belief in a contents task. Al-
though personal activity is certainly increased in this version, at
the same time so are the executive demands reduced (in this case,
working memory). Similarly, reducing the inhibitory demands of
deception tasks also results in improved performance (Carlson et
al. 1998; Hala & Russell 2001), whereas simply removing the op-
ponent – and hence reducing the social demands – does not (Hala
& Russell 2001). The reverse pattern is also found. That is, in-
creasing the inhibitory demands of theory-of-mind tasks detracts
from performance (Leslie & Polizzi 1998).
Though I use these examples of modified tasks to illustrate that
a more gradual onset of social understanding is consistent with an
executive account, I am not claiming that it is simply information-
processing complexities of specific tasks that stand in the way of
young children and their supposed theories of mind. Instead, I,
and others, suggest that there is a deeper relation between exec-
utive function and developing social understanding. Exactly what
this relation is has yet to be specified. Development of executive
function may make possible the emergence of a theory of mind
(Moses 2001). Alternatively, it may be that a strong relation is con-
sistently found between theory of mind and executive control, not
because one is causally implicated in the other in a linear fashion,
but because the two are interdependent in their development.
Admittedly, the bulk of the research on the relation between ex-
ecutive function and social understanding is of the individual-dif-
ferences variety and has not, as yet, wed itself to charting the so-
cial interactions the child is surrounded by. In principle, however,
the executive and constructivist accounts are not mutually exclu-
sive. Interaction with others challenges children’s current execu-
tive abilities, and, in Piaget’s terms, adaptation in knowledge struc-
tures may result, leading to increased knowledge and flexibility in
their thinking about their own and others’ mental lives. As chil-
dren grow in their executive function abilities, they become more
adept at interacting with and understanding others.
Introducing executive function ability into the epistemic equa-
tion affords a view of the process of development as bidirectional.
As has long been maintained by those who adopt a dynamic sys-
tems approach (e.g., Bronfenbrenner 1989; Gottlieb 1991; Scarr
& McCartney 1983/1984), the characteristics of the child influ-
ence the response of the environment just as the environment in-
fluences the child. In this vein, children’s executive maturity will,
at least in part, influence how their parents respond to them,
which in turn will influence and further enhance their developing
executive control and social understanding.
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Abstract: Interpersonal understanding is rooted in social engagement.
The question is: How? What features of intersubjective coordination are
essential for the growth of concepts about the mind, and how does devel-
opment proceed on this basis? Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) offer many
telling insights, but their account begs questions about the earliest forms
of self-other linkage and differentiation, especially as mediated by
processes of identification.
The article by Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) is an important cor-
rective to contemporary misconceptions about the development
of interpersonal understanding. The authors analyse distortions
introduced by individualistic “theory of mind” perspectives that
purport to show how children might derive concepts (even con-
cepts of mind) without appropriate forms of interpersonal en-
gagement, and they highlight the equally devastating limitations
of simulationist accounts that presuppose understanding of one’s
own mind as a basis for understanding the minds of others. The
arguments they marshal from Wittgenstein and Chapman in par-
ticular are, in my view, decisive. As C&L indicate, a theory in
which social exchanges are constitutive of understanding does not
lead to cultural relativism. On the contrary, it is only through in-
volvement with others that human beings are in a position to ac-
cord objective reality the status it deserves, and only when objec-
tive reality is conceived as such do concepts such as “belief” gain
a purchase. Moreover, mutual interpersonal relations that entail
communication and reference vis-à-vis a shared external world
provide a necessary basis for uniquely human ways of (1) acquir-
ing knowledge about that world; (2) understanding what it is to be
a person with alternative psychological perspectives on that world;
and even (3) thinking symbolically and creatively about people
and things and constructing concepts with which to think.
How, then, should we frame our account of early human devel-
opment if we are to elucidate how all this is possible and how de-
velopment proceeds from its starting point? Here I wonder
whether C&L are sufficiently radical in their revamping of theory.
Consider how concepts of “self” and “other” are integral to con-
cepts of mind. There is a paradox at the heart of any attempt to
reconcile developmental accounts of self-other understanding
that focus on the individual’s cognitive endowment, on the one
hand, and social influences, on the other. The paradox is that an
individual has to have bedrock experience of the social as social in
order to build upon this to construct progressively elaborated un-
derstandings of minds as connected and differentiated centres of
consciousness. Without some primitive modes of experiencing self
as self in relation to others, and of others as others in relation to
self, it is difficult to see how concepts of self and other could be
derived. (Note: this does not mean that infants, even infants at the
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the mental lives of others.)
The direction in which C&L move on this one, is to stress the
activities within which human interaction is embedded, adopting
what they call “a relational, action-based perspective” within
which communicative interaction also plays an essential role. Yes,
but what is the grounding for communication? When the authors
state that “Children’s social knowledge is based on action” (sect. 3,
para. 4), they are in danger of losing the plot. The crux is how in-
fants experience the activities and attitudes of self and other in in-
terpersonal relations, not merely how they act or interact with oth-
ers. C&L refer to the embodied nature of human exchanges, but
they do little to explain how infants are aware of persons as hav-
ing a mental as well as physical dimension, and how the nature of
this awareness is such as to allow for the partitioning into what be-
longs to the other and what to the self over successive phases of
development. What we need to explain, after all, is how a child
comes to understand persons as centres of individual experience,
not merely as centres of causality, and how the child’s concepts
about the different facets of subjective orientation towards the
world (intentions, feelings, wishes, beliefs, and so on) develop in
the early years of life. Alongside this, we need to account for the
forms of reflection and thinking about people – oneself as well as
others – that such concepts entail.
I think the solution to the conundrum is that humans are
equipped with a propensity for forms of role-taking that both link
an individual infant or child or adult with someone else, and at the
same time register the distinctiveness of self and other. At first
such role-taking is cognitively unelaborated, not yet amounting to
understanding: It takes place without pre-existing thought and in
a manner that is heavily imbued with emotion. From early in life,
children are moved by the attitudes of others: They are drawn to
identify with the psychological stance of a person with whom they
engage. It is through this mechanism that mutual relations with
others vis-à-vis a shared world yield the ability to relate to one’s
own mental relations, and with this, creates a kind of mental space
within which new forms of thinking are possible. A prime exam-
ple of how individuals interiorize the social, Vygotsky-style.
There is another sense in which this approach is more radical
than that of C&L. These authors give weight to the influence of
mother-child as well as peer relations in the ability to acquire and
apply concepts of mind. Here the active ingredients of develop-
ment are conceptualised in terms of cooperative social interaction
and exposure to talk about mental states. No doubt these things
are important. Beyond this, however, powerful socio-emotional
forces are at play.
Especially when you are in the heat of relating to others, it can
be an emotionally taxing business to think flexibly and to deploy
mental concepts effectively. Critically important for the early de-
velopment of this capacity are young children’s relations with at
least one other person who is able to tune into their minds. The
developmental influences are not merely intellectual, they are also
emotional. Studies in developmental psychopathology reveal that
in order to employ mind-related thinking effectively, one needs to
do more than construct understanding. To maintain a reflective
stance towards one’s own and others’ minds, one also needs to be
in appropriate forms of relation with oneself and others. Emo-
tional relatedness towards persons-as-represented in the mind is
a vital force in intrapsychic as well as interpersonal functioning,
and such relatedness and representation are powerfully influ-
enced by identification with the attitudes of others.
The sources of mentalistic understanding involve much more
than action, even co-action with others.
The sibling relationship as a context for the
development of social understanding
Nina Howe
Department of Education, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec H3G 1M8,
Canada. nina.howe@education.concordia.ca
Commentary/Carpendale & Lewis: Constructing an understanding of mind
110 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1
Text removed due to third party copyright